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INTRODUCTION 
 
“What role do norms play in political change, whose norms matter, and how do we know they 
matter?” These questions have come back on the research agenda of political science and 
international relations scholars in the last two decades (March and Olsen 1989; Krasner 1988; 
Ruggie 1993; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). As norms have regained a prominent place on the 
research agenda, calls have emerged to explore more systematically the link between social 
context and rationality (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Scholars from various theoretical 
traditions have highlighted the possibility of cooperation between rationalist and sociological-
constructivist paradigms and have outlined research strategies and methodological approaches 
(Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel 2003). This paper explores possibilities of cooperation between 
rationalist and sociological insights by examining the institutionalization of legislative powers in 
the European Parliament (EP). By this, we refer to the social processes unfolding as the EP 
goes from being a de jure legislator (in virtue of its constitutional empowerment in successive 
EU treaties), to becoming a living legislator (in virtue of its everyday engagement in EU ordinary 
legislation subject to the so-called co-decision procedure). Between 1994 and 2014, the number 
of policy areas constitutionally subject to co-decision was multiplied by five, putting the EP on 
par with the Council of Ministers (‘Council’) in a broad range of domains ranging from highly 
redistributive types of policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy to technically arcane 
policies in the domain of financial regulation and harmonization. During the course of the 7th 
term, the EP had passed 488 legislative acts under co-decision (European Parliament, 2014a). 
In legislating, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) develop and mobilize a collection 
of norms, which regulate their collective behavior while infusing it with purpose. In this paper, 
we are interested in tracing and explaining this developing body of norms, drawing on the rich 
theoretical scholarship on norms.  
 
Investigating the institutionalization of the EP’s legislative power is intrinsically important as it 
pertains to the evolving dynamics of regional and global governance. The EP’s legislative 
empowerment is a key and unprecedented development in regional governance. Quite uniquely 
in a comparative perspective, it lays the foundations of a new kind of parliamentary order 
developing across borders and involving several levels of political jurisdiction. This emerging 
“multi-level parliamentary field” is centered on the Council of Ministers and the EP, and 
embedded in a broader web of ties between EU-level legislators and the EU’s 28 national 
parliaments (Crum and Fossum 2009; Rose 2013; Rittberger and Winzen forthcoming). 
Understanding the working and institutionalization of this new kind of parliamentary order is 
not just relevant for scholars of EU politics, but more broadly for scholars of regional and 
	2	
	
global governance. As a result, directly-elected MEPs have a direct say in how global regulation 
in a broad range of domains is ‘implemented’ in Europe and they may now influence global 
negotiations through shaping the EU position over the long-term and exercising their power of 
consent. Such developments would have been hard to predict only ten years ago, and they are 
certainly not something that observers of global governance would have anticipated. Global 
governance has often appeared to be the more or less an exclusive playground of executive and 
judiciary governmental officials, leaving parliamentary actors as the losers (Slaughter 2004). 
 
Furthermore, investigating the institutionalization of the EP’s legislative powers is theoretically 
important for it will help us address questions of theoretical dialogue that are on the frontier of 
the current research agenda. On the face of it, the emergence of ‘in-house’ EP norms of law-
making is unlikely to happen. The legislative empowerment of the EP has generated an intense 
rivalry between Council and the EP. After an initial period of regular power contests, the two 
legislators have found a modus vivendi in trilogues, i.e., informal meetings between 
representatives of the EP, Council, and Commission with a view to adopt early agreements and 
thus facilitate the legislative coordination. These elements lend prima facie credibility to 
arguments about the development of a thin, or strategic normative environment. In this 
environment, collective action problems would drive institutional innovation and efficiency 
calculation as a basic logic of individual as well as collective behavior. If norms developed at all, 
they would originate in the inter-institutional interactions underpinning trilogues, and be largely 
shaped by the Council’s diplomatic culture and internal power structure. The reason for this is 
that trilogues are now used on a broad scale and take place in a secluded setting—two elements 
(institutional density and insulation) that are known to facilitate the development of trust and 
socialization.  
 
However, the emerging scholarly literature illuminating these questions does not point to a 
clear, let alone complete, picture. What we have instead is an emerging debate between two 
positions. On the one hand, we have a ‘realist’ position indicating that Council diplomacy has 
tamed EP power (Jacqué 2009; Burns et al. 2013; Ripoll Servent 2011; Reh et al., 2013). This 
view is underpinned by a combination of rationalist and sociological-constructivist arguments. 
On the other hand, we have a ‘public politics’ position pointing to the development of 
endogenous norms of legislative behavior and elements of a collective identity of the EP as a 
‘normal’ parliament (Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood 2015). This view is more squarely 
embedded in the sociological-constructivist tradition although it leaves room for a dialogue 
with rationalism. This debate raises a series of important questions. To what extent do MEPs 
feel bound by norms of law-making? What are these norms? Who promotes them and how? 
Who adopts these norms and through what mechanisms are they transmitted? What is the logic 
of norm-compliant behavior? Furthermore, we need a more systematic examination of these 
questions. Norm promotion and diffusion takes time; and it is not an even or irreversible 
process. Therefore, we need to incorporate time and a comparison of practices across EP 
committees. 
 
Our aim with this paper is to provide more systematic evidence on the institutionalization of 
the EP’s legislative powers and to probe the respective ability of rationalist and sociological-
constructivist frameworks to illuminate observed empirical patterns. Our working assumption 
	3	
	
is that neither framework fully explains what is going on and that we need to rely on a 
combination of insights from these two perspectives. Prospects for a theoretical synthesis 
probably lie in developing a framework that allows for theorizing sequences with different 
logics (institutionalization over time) and, or specifying domains of application for the 
respective theories at a given point in time (institutionalization across EP committees).  
 
We proceed in three steps. First, we offer an overview of the EP as a legislator, including a 
concise review of how the EP’s legislative remit has increased in successive EU Treaties 
(constitutional basis), how this has translated in everyday policy-making (legislative record on 
co-decision over time), and how various EP committees are involved in joint-legislating (the 
distinction between so-called ‘legislative” and ‘non-legislative’ committees). Second, we specify 
the rationalist and the sociological-constructivist images of EP behavior in law-making, 
focusing on distilling key assumptions and their evidentiary implications (Lewis 2003; Jupille, 
Caporaso, and Checkel 2003). These theoretical sketches allow for sketching out a broad range 
of ideal-types of EP behavior ranging from: a strategic behavior displaying little evidence of 
normative density; a realist behavior attesting to the pull of inter-institutional norms; and a 
public politics behavior attesting to the pull of intra-institutional (in house) norms. Third, we 
set out to probe the usefulness of these analytical sketches based on interview and documentary 
data. Reality, as mentioned, is likely to display various mixes of rationalist and sociological-
constructivist logics, and the ideal-types delineated in the theoretical part. We structure our 
empirical investigation around a time dimension (process tracing of the reform of the EP rules 
of procedure leading to Rule 73 and 74) and a cross-committee comparative dimension as a 
way to probe the domain of application of different theories (scope condition).  
 
THE EP AS AN ORDINARY LEGISLATOR 
 
The EP is a unique exemplar of a supranational parliament endowed with a real legislative 
function (Rittberger 2005). The transformation of the EP from a ‘talking shop’ into ‘a working 
parliament’ with legislative powers started with the Single European Act (1987) and the 
introduction of a proto-legislative procedure involving the EP (“cooperation” procedure) and 
picked up pace in the 1990s with the introduction and normalization of the co-decision 
procedure, today called the ordinary legislative procedure. Four indicators sum up this 
transformation. First, the number of policy areas subject to co-decision was multiplied by 5, 
from 15 to 85, between Maastricht (1993) and Lisbon (2009). Second, over the same period, the 
number of co-decision files adopted by the EP and Council almost tripled over the same 
period—from 165 in EP4 to 488 in EP7. Third, as the volume of legislation increased, the 
legislative process de facto became a single-reading process, with 85% of all co-decision files 
adopted in first reading in EP7, as opposed to 29% in EP5, when the EU Treaties first opened 
up the possibility to conclude co-decision files in first reading. The ‘critical tipping point’ 
(Héritier and Reh, 2012) was reached during EP6 (2004-2009), where by mid-term half of all 
legislative files were adopted through early legislative agreements. Fourth, with the EU 
legislation now being increasingly adopted in first reading, trilogues have become a permanent 
feature of the EU legislative process. Trilogues have no reference in EU Treaties. They are 
informal inter-institutional negotiations between the representatives of the EP, the Council, and 
the Commission with a view to adopting a co-decision. They first emerged after the 1992 
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Treaty of Maastricht as an informal mechanism aimed at facilitating agreement during the ‘last 
chance’ stage of conciliation between the EP and the Council. They grew into more general use 
when ‘both the Parliament and the Council quickly recognized that the plenary meetings of the 
Conciliation Committee were unsuited to striking deals and compromises’ (European 
Parliament, 2013, p.4). In EP7, 1541 trilogues were held for a total of 488 adopted co-decision 
files (European Parliament, 2014b).  
 
This transformation affects the daily policy output and practices of the EP as well as its 
organization. Co-decision legislation has become a significant part of the EP’s activity. A 
testimony to the dynamism of co-decision, all EP committees in EP7 (except for PETI) had 
co-decision files, even though the legislative reality they dealt with was very different (table 1).  
 
 Eight committees were routine legislators: these committees produced a high volume of 
legislation (represented in dark shade in table 1), accounting for more than 75% of all 
EP7 adopted co-decision files. Interestingly, routine legislators include both newcomers 
to co-decision (LIBE; INTA) as well as established players (ENVI, ITRA, TRAN, 
IMCO, ITRE, and ECON). To this core group, one may add four committees (in light 
shade in table 1) dealing with co-decision somewhat less regularly and accounting for 
18% of all EP7 adopted co-decision files: these include both newcomers (AGRI, 
PECH) and established players (EMPL, REGI).  
 A fairly large group were exceptional legislators: these seven committees dealt with co-
decision on an exceptional irregular basis (5% of all EP7 co-decision files).   
 
All EP committees relied on informal trilogues; but ECON clearly emerged as the single-largest 
consumer of trilogues, accounting on its own for more than 20% all trilogues held in EP7.  
 
Table 1 here 
  
The organization of the EP legislative process is structured around the committees and a few 
other political and administrative bodies, some of which have grown over time as a result of the 
EP’s effort to provide its members with technical and political support in the legislative 
process.  
 
The EP’s standing committees have been called the ‘legislative backbone’ of the EP 
(Westlake 1994, 191). Once the plenary has referred a Commission legislative proposal to a 
committee (then called ‘lead committee’), it is within the lead committee that EU legislative 
proposals are first debated, EP amendments drafted, and the negotiating mandate voted, before 
the opening of inter-institutional negotiations with Council and Commission representatives.1  
Key actors in EP committees have traditionally been the Rapporteur, the committee member 
designated to draw up the committee’s legislative report and the political coordinators, who 
coordinate the political groups’ position within the committees and provide the political glue 
holding the committee’s position together. Recently, the November 2012 reform of the EP 
Rules of Procedure strengthened the role of the committee chair (or designated vice-chair) by 
																																																								
1	 The exception of a plenary endorsed mandate, under Rule 74 of the EP Rules of Procedure is discussed later, as well as 
provision for associated (Rule 54) and joint committees (Rule 55). 	
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making her/him a de jure member of the EP negotiating team in trilogues (Rule 70 continued as 
Rule 73 in EP8) and providing for the possibility of involving the plenary in the adoption of the 
negotiation mandate (Rule 70a, continued as Rule 74 in EP8). This reform specified and made 
binding the Code of Conduct for Negotiating in the Context of Codecision Procedures, concluded at the 
end of the sixth term, and established as an Annex (XX) to the Rules of Procedure (Héritier 
and Reh 2012).  
 
Besides the standing committees, two other political bodies structure the legislative process of 
the EP. The Conference of Presidents (CoP) is the creature of the EP’s political groups. It is 
composed of the President of the EP and the chairs of the EP’s political groups and its core 
responsibility is to “manage” the “political aspects of its activities, including the organization of 
Parliament’s work…”  As regards the internal work of the EP, the CoP may thus initiate 
parliamentary reform, arbitrate as last resort in disputes between committees, etc. The 
Conference of Committee Chairs (CCC) is composed of the chairs of all EP standing and 
special parliamentary committees. It meets once a month in Strasbourg. Its role is to “monitor 
the progress of work in committees, and ensure cooperation and coordination between them. It 
also submits recommendations to the CoP regarding, inter alia, the draft agenda of forthcoming 
plenary sessions” (European Parliament 2014a, 29). Interviewees regularly described the 
meetings of the CCC as a source of tedium rather than inspiration.  
 
On the administrative side, the committee secretariats are a key legislative resource. Under 
current EP rules, secretariat members are required to move twice in their first seven years, and 
once thereafter, which provides for both a loss of institutional memory, as well as an influx of 
new experiences. Furthermore, the horizontal Conciliations and Codecision Unit (CODE) 
of the EP, currently 6 administrators and 6 assistants, assists the committees with procedural 
strategic advice. This involves supporting measures like intranet documentation offering 
guidance for those engaged in organizing and conducting trilogue meetings, informal but 
regular learning networks, and (new to EP8) the establishment of ‘project teams’2 to support 
members involved in trilogues, including assignment of designated personnel from CODE to 
each legislative file to act in an advisory capacity where needed. Finally, the unit for 
coordination of legislation (CORDLEG) of roughly equivalent staff serves the CCC while 
coordinating the workflow of EP committees. For the first time at the end of EP7, it published 
summary statistics on various aspects of the committee’s legislative work, including trilogue 
activities, challenges of referral decisions, organization of public hearings, etc.  
 
In a subsequent section, we examine the role that these actors have played in producing, 
diffusing, and institutionalization norms of legislative behavior among MEPs. Next, we turn to 
the conceptual framework of our analysis.  
 
 
NORMS AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE EP’s LEGISLATIVE 
POWER 
 
																																																								
2	These involve a list of names drawn from a committee secretariat, lawyer-linguists, members of the research services, as 
well as CODE members. 
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Norms are generally described as prescriptions of social role, i.e.: rules or standards of behavior 
‘in terms of rights and obligations’ (Krasner 1983, 3) (“do’s” and “don’t do’s”), applying to 
specific situations involving two or more actors orienting themselves towards one another. 
These rules may be informal (uncodified), or they may be written down in an enforceable 
document (codified); the point, however, is that norms need not be codified in order to 
produce behavioral effects. Finally, norms ‘isolate single standards of behavior’ whereas 
institutions are collections of norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). This general 
description helps distinguish norms from cognate concepts (law, philosophical teachings, 
individual life rules, institutions, etc.) but it is theoretically ambiguous because it fails to specify 
the nature of these rules and the logic of their effects. Inspired by Lewis’s 2003 analysis of 
“everyday decision-making” in COREPER and Finnemore and Sikkink’s “lifecycle of norms”, 
we spell out the key assumptions of the rationalist and sociological-constructivist paradigm, 
specify implications at different phases of the lifecycle of norms (emergence, diffusion, and 
internalization), as well as the evidence that would substantiate these assumptions.  
 
In the rationalist view, norms are understood broadly as coordinating devices, or instruments 
that facilitate social interaction (Ullmann-Margalit 1977; Schelling, 1960; Stein 1990; and 
Binmore 1994). Social interaction is not always possible, let alone smooth or optimal, due to 
various collective action problems. Norms allow for the possibility of social interaction by 
addressing these problems and lowering the cost of transactions. This perspective is therefore 
more interested in the form than in the content of norms (Florini, 1996)—i.e., the “what for?” 
of norms rather than their “what?” It sees norms as exogenously given (or “preset”: Lewis 
2003), meaning norms are fixed, and are determined by a standard, which is external to the 
content of social interaction, namely utility or function. This does not mean that rationalists 
cannot operate with normative change: iterative games can integrate new preferences and 
information transfers, and therefore evolving norms. However, these approaches cannot 
explain, and are not interested in explaining, how and why norms change and arise, and why 
among functionally-equivalent norms some are preferred over others (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1996; Florini 1996). Finally, this perspective captures the behavioral effects of norms through 
the logic of consequence: actors follow the rules because it is in their interest to do so and they 
expect particular rewards.  
 
Sociological-constructivist views, by contrast, adopt a narrower approach to norms by reserving 
the term exclusively for legitimate standards of behavior. Social interaction, in their view, is 
embedded in identity and produces meaning. Norms regulate behavior by producing legitimate 
prescriptions, or “standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore 
and Sikkink 1996, 891; our emphasis). The fact that standards are embedded in “a given 
identity” circumscribes the “realm of conceivable behavior” (Florini 1996, 366; Katzenstein 
1996). Norms are endogenously constructed, meaning “interaction and the exchange of view 
can lead to the creation of new… roles” (Lewis 2003, 107). Persuasion and socialization are the 
two key mechanisms involved; but sociological approaches inspired by new institutionalism 
also point to the role of preconscious mimesis. 
 
These views imply different predictions for the emergence, diffusion, and internalization of 
norms, which can be summed up in the following table (table 2). 
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Table 2 here 
 
Equipped with these lenses, it is safe to assume that EP behavior in ordinary legislation may 
reflect a variety of logics. This makes sense given the highly decentralized nature of the EP and 
the diversity of EU policy-making modes and contexts. Investigating EP norms is not easy in 
practice, however, given the informal and secluded character of ordinary law-making (trilogues) 
and the possibility that much knowledge on norms is tacit. Our research strategy combines 
interpretive and process-tracing methods. We “access” data by talking with a broad range of 
ordinary law-makers—in the EP as well as in other institutions, and a close reading of relevant 
documents. In the 2014-2015 period, we conducted more than 40 interviews with trilogues as 
the main focus: six with MEPs (of which five with committee chairs), 16 with committee 
secretariats, four with other DG IPol officials, three with Commission civil servants, 10 with 
Council civil servants and two with members of national permanent representations. Typical of 
the interpretive method, we “brought back … copious interview … observational notes and … 
notes on documents” (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, xix). These were especially useful to 
chart normative contexts. We supplemented these with a close reading of relevant documents 
including minutes of CCC meetings, CoP meetings, and Council meetings, in order to trace 
norm development over time.   
 
 
A LIVING LEGISLATURE 
 
From the start, trilogues were a matter of collective reflection and debate in the EP. Within a 
decade, this reflection led to a series of steps to regulate this practice, culminating in November 
2012 with the reform of the EP Rules of Procedure. The result ‘codify[ed] to a large extent 
existing practices in committees’ (European Parliament, 2014a, p.23). A key issue 
throughout the reform process had become the variation of practice in use of the Code across 
committees (European Parliament, 2013), and the task had in part become one of formalizing 
best practice from norm entrepreneurs. New features involved: a formal committee decision to 
open informal negotiations; the inclusion of the Committee Chair (or designated Vice-Chair) in 
the negotiating team; and the possibility of involving Plenary in the preparation of a mandate 
(Rule 70a).3  By 2012, when the new provisions came into effect, a process of formalization 
into rules with a binding status had been completed, ensuring improved flows of information 
between the EP negotiators and the Committee as well as the political groups. The following 
analysis charts the historical path of reform (process tracing) and explore to what extent EP 
committee practices have converged around a distinct set of norms (EP committee 
comparison).  
 
Emergence of norms: The “tipping point” of the 2012 reform of the Rules of Procedure 
At an early stage, there were anxieties within the EP that secluded inter-organizational 
bargaining would require it to leave behind the traditional strengths of a legislature in contested 
discourse, and enter the potential entrapment of the Council’s web of quiet diplomacy. There 
was also a central tension that trilogues would result in a strong asymmetry between largerun 
																																																								
3	The Guerrero Salom (Rapporteur, S&D) amendments, adopted in November 2012. In the current (8th) EP term, Rule 70(a) 
became Rule 74. 
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and smaller parties, because the larger parties take the lead on the overwhelming majority of 
legislative files, with the Rapporteur left unsupervised to bargain with the Council Presidency 
and re-present outcomes as a fait accompli in the EP. This central cleavage crystallized when the 
group of Vice-Presidents responsible for oversight of co-decision within the EP first raised the 
issue formally in 2001, resulting in the establishment in 2004 of a set of best practice Guidelines 
for First and Second Reading Agreements under the Codecision Procedure, aimed at some degree of 
oversight through committee political coordinators, but ‘riddled with compromise 
formulations’ (Héritier and Reh, 2012, p.1145) and no mechanisms of enforcement. According 
to the key official in the Council during this period, ‘the guiding principles remained sufficiently 
vague to allow the practitioners of codecision the necessary degree of flexibility and discretion’ 
(European Parliament 2013, p.4).  
 
The momentum of parliamentary reform was irresistible for an EP seeking to press its claims as 
democratic champion (table 3). Sometimes, the vote in plenary took place too soon after the 
vote in committee in order to allow for full discussion, indicating that trilogues had been 
conducted before an official committee mandate was in place. Internal discontent with the lack 
of regulation was evident (Huber and Shackleton 2013); it was only a matter of time before this 
would attract external criticism. 4 
 
Table 3 here 
 
The CoP was the arena in which the decision to set in motion a reform process was taken, in  
2007. This process was led by MEP Roth-Berendt, a senior MEP5 within a Working Party from 
the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) on the basis of drafts prepared by the co-
decision unit (CODE) of the EP (Héritier and Reh, 2012), to negotiate and deliver to the CoP a 
series of recommendations for revision to the EPs Rules of Procedure. The result was a  ‘more 
binding and precise’ (Héritier and Reh, 2012: p.1148) Code of Conduct for Negotiating in the Context 
of Codecision Procedures, concluded at the end of the sixth term, and established as an Annex (XX) 
to the Rules of Procedure. Our interview with one of the norm entrepreneurs established the 
importance of the CODE unit as a source of the 2009 revisions (interview 3, 9.9.2014). The 
Code established the key factors of oversight and pluralization present today: that committees, 
rather than political coordinators, would be the formal mechanism of oversight; that a decision 
to enter into negotiations, as well as a specific negotiating mandate, should first originate from 
a committee (other than in exceptional cases); and that a negotiating team would include 
Shadow Rapporteurs (or political group coordinators or advisors). The final report of the 
Working Party still shows that at least some leading MEPs saw the growth of early agreements 
and trilogues as a reversible phenomenon. One of the recommendations was indeed that “as a 
rule, Parliament should make use of all stages of the codecision procedure and agreements in 
early stages should be the exception and respect certain criteria” (European Parliament 2010, 
10). By the end of the 6th term of the EP in 2009, however, some 82% of all adopted 
codecision files were early agreements. From 2009 on, the financial crisis and the concurrent 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty were powerful structural forces behind the continued 
																																																								
4	See, for instance: Bunyan, 2007; House of Lords, 2009; EU Observer, 2014; International New York Times, 2014.	
5	Now Socialists & Democrats (S&D) 
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growth of early agreements. Financial integration picked up speed while co-decision was 
extended from a core (minority) of committees to all committees.  
 
ECON provided a distinct input into the process. Before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 
Europe, ECON under the chairmanship of MEP Berès (S&D) had developed a practice norm 
of the committee Chair attending all trilogue meetings as a means of enforcing committee 
positions (Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood 2015). The rationale for this approach was to 
increase the representativeness of the EP team, out of the axiom “tell me who wrote the rule, 
and I’ll tell you what’s in it.”  Berès transferred this practice to the next parliamentary term 
when she became chair of the Employment and Social Affairs Committee (EMPL) from 2009 
to 2014. Importantly, the legacy she left in ECON was continued by her successor Sharon 
Bowles, ECON Chair from 2009 to 2014, in the midst of the financial crisis (Roederer-Rynning & 
Greenwood, 2015). Control over logistical arrangements6, in particular, helped the EP to 
achieve its institutional prerogatives, used to the full by ECON, which participated in EP7 in 
more than twice as many trilogues than any other EP Committee (Roederer-Rynning and 
Greenwood, 2015).  
 
The CCC had in the mid-2000s sought to contribute to parliamentary reform, by organizing 
“away days” resulting in the Limelette Declaration (2006) and the Strasbourg Declaration 
(2007)—(Limelette +”). While both declarations were used as an agenda-setting instrument for 
the work of the CoP, neither referred explicitly to the issue of trilogues. It is only from 2010 on 
that the CCC began paying more systematic its attention to the issue of trilogues. In October, it 
held extensive exchange of views with contributions by the Secretaries General of the political 
groups. The issue was taken up in CoP in the spring of 2011, leading to the formal invitation to 
AFCO to review the Rules of Procedure of the EP. AFCO’s mandate was to review the Rules:  
with a view to making the procedures more effective, more transparent, and more inclusive through the 
incorporation of some key elements of the Code of conduct for negotiating in the context of the ordinary 
legislative procedures in the binding part of the Rules, and in particular those parts on:  
- the decision of a committee to enter into negotiation; 
- the decision on the composition and mandate of the negotiating team; 
- the regular report-back to the committee concerned on the progress and outcome of the 
negotiations, including any agreement reached;  
- the re-consultation of the committee on the text agreed before the vote in plenary.  
European Parliament; our emphasis (2012, 9).  
 
Minutes of CCC meetings on 25 October 2011 and 13 December 2011 show the role of this 
body in structuring a collective reflection as well as crystallizing positions in AFCO and among 
the committee chairs. One of the reasons for the reform process, AFCO Rapporteur Guerrero 
Salom highlighted in the first CCC debate, was “the existing asymmetry between Committees 
on the application of the code of conduct when it comes to negotiating first-reading 
agreements”; and this was preoccupying in a context marked by the increase of early 
agreements (CCC Chair “Mr. LEHNE recalled that according to available statistics, 78% of all 
																																																								
6	The prevailing rule is that trilogues are held on EP premises, and therefore the logistical arrangements are made by 
committee secretariats. This is increasingly being diluted by logistical realities of a lack of rooms, meaning that some are 
being held on Council, and Presidency, premises. 
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legislative texts have been adopted through first-reading which is on the increase”). Several 
committee chairs participated in the debate—overwhelmingly from committees accustomed to 
dealing with co-decision7. While we don’t have access to the details of their discussion, we 
know that they “underlined their scepticism as to the need to adopt legislative texts quickly; 
speed sometimes being detrimental to quality. They especially warned against "trophy 
agreements” for the Presidency when reaching the end of a six month term” (European 
Parliament 2011a, 4-5).  
 
The second CCC meeting, on 13 December 2011, gave further insights into the scope and 
depth of the internal debate. Divergences of views within the EP existed as to the involvement 
of the plenary in the delivery of negotiation mandates. There was also a discussion of the 
options for making the negotiating mandate more transparent. The case of procedures with 
associated committees was discussed. An important part of the debate, at that point, focused 
on the respective role of committee and plenary in trilogue negotiations. These debates 
highlighted, once again, the collective need to strike a balance between efficiency and 
transparency. This time, the ECON Chair stressed that “if the rules under consideration 
[regarding the involvement of plenary in the delivery of mandates] had been in force at the time 
of the negotiations on the ‘six pack’, the adoption of those files would have been impossible … 
the negotiations were usually so urgent that submitting mandates to Plenary would unduly delay 
the whole process” (European Parliament 2011b, 7). ECON was the only committee delivering 
an opinion on the AFCO Report on Rule 70, insisting on the role of the committee chair in the 
negotiations and the need to provide mandates in the form of amendments rather than general 
orientations. Whilst these high standards were not incorporated in the final version voted 
through by plenary, their inclusion within the AFCO report to plenary helped to create 
something of a marker by way or norm internalization, discussed below. 
 
The reform of the RoP (70 and 70a) can be considered as a tipping point in the development of 
practice norms of trilogues. Most importantly, perhaps, the norm of “active chair”, promoted 
vigorously by a handful of leading MEPs—especially Berès and Bowles, as chairs of ECON—
was entrenched in a binding format.  
 
Norm diffusion and internationalization: Routine and exceptional legislators 
According to EP official documents, Rules 70 and Rule 70a simply ‘codified existing practice of 
committees’ (European Parliament, 2014a, p.23). Committees new to co-decision could follow 
the best practice example set by the committee most involved in trilogues in EP6, ECON, led 
by Berès, while most of the original core group could evolve towards the new standards in 
EP7. But to what extent and how have other EP committee practices converged in reality?  
 
Although a norm of committee chairs attending all, or almost all, trilogue meetings had 
emerged in some committees before the end of EP7, fieldwork highlights the value of 
distinguishing between routine legislators and exceptional legislators. Among the committees 
that we have dubbed routine legislators, there is a substantial convergence around the principle of 
chair attendance in trilogues. In ECON, Bowles emulated the practice established by Berès in 
																																																								
7 Ms. BERÈS, Chair of EMPL, Ms. BOWLES, Chair of ECON, Mr. MOREIRA, Chair of INTA, Mr. HARBOUR, Chair 
of IMCO, Mr. REUL, Chair of ITRE, Mr. SIMPSON, Chair of TRAN and Mr. LEHNE, Chair of JURI. 
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attending/chairing every trilogue meeting, imposing her own authority through control of 
logistical arrangements (Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, 2015). The Chair of IMCO 
adopted the practices from ECON. The Chair of INTA has also made a priority of attending 
all trilogues—secondment by a Vice-Chair is not used. The same situation applies for REGI—
though interestingly not for AGRI, which resorted to secondment (by a Vice-Chair) in trilogue 
negotiations in the first CAP reform under co-decision in 2013. In this group of committees, 
TRAN was a notable departure from the norm of Chair attendance, the committee chair 
attending typically the concluding trilogue sessions or those anticipated to be most 
troublesome. We interpret this departure as reflecting the chair “style”, rather than conflicting 
with the meaning of emerging EP norms. TRAN is the only EP committee where a significant 
number of legislative files  (a quarter of all TRAN files) continued to be concluded in second 
(not early second) and third readings in EP7. This reflected a viewpoint of the retiring 
committee Chair that the EP’s interests could be well served by agreements later in the 
legislative process (Interview 2, 20.5.2014). The same argument applies regarding chair 
attendance in trilogues. At an EP hosted conference to mark ‘20 Years of Codecision’ the chair of 
TRAN described this practice as a tactical move aimed at conveying the message that ‘when the 
Chair comes, the Council knows it’s getting serious.’8   
 
In the group of exceptional legislators, practice and knowledge varied broadly. In some 
committees, the chair was inactive in trilogues; and sometimes, this practice was associated with 
an unclear perception of the role of the chair in trilogues under the revised Rules of Procedure. 
In trilogues, the rapporteur and/or the administrative staff filled in the vacuum left by the 
chair. In another, the practice was mixed; but there was a clear perception that the new Rules of 
Procedure had clarified the role of the chair in trilogues. Yet in another, the chair was said to be 
present throughout the trilogues. Finally, one chair was said to be not only active in the political 
trilogues but also systematically at the level of technical discussions.  
 
Understanding the carriers and mechanisms of diffusion of norms is only starting. As a starting 
point, we recall the two-edged effect of rules on the mobility of the EP administrative staff: 
both facilitating the cross-dissemination and diffusion of practices and norms across the EP 
and impeding the constitution of an institutional memory at the level of individual EP 
committees. REGI sought to remedy the loss of institutional memory by writing a vademecum. 
We had to reconsider our initial assumption that emulation or mimesis underpinned the 
diffusion of ECON norms. Committees do not “pick up” practices from observing practice in 
other committees—at least not directly. CODE diffuses some committee norms (in particular 
ECON norms) as best practices to EP committees less experienced with legislating—but this is 
socialization, rather than emulation. For more experienced committees, the CCC (though 
frequently described as a dull place) appears a more relevant and likely forum of socialization 
and diffusion of legitimate standards of behavior. One committee chair emphasized the	
																																																								
8	http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/other-events/video?event=20131105-0900-SPECIAL consulted on 27 
February 2014.	
Because of the global financial crisis, ECON was the source of substantial legislation in EP7, 
accounting for more than one-fifth of all trilogues in which the EP was involved—and 
therefore, ECON practice under Bowles was critical for the EP as a whole, in part diffused and 
internalized through overlapping committee membership. 
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socialization effects that committees exert on political group coordinators as a mechanism of 
norm diffusion. MEPs’ overlapping memberships was also described as a factor of diffusion of 
norms from one committee to another.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Seeking meaning in a disorderly pattern of institutionalization of EP power, Héritier and Reh 
have earlier found supporting evidence for both rationalist and sociological-constructivist based 
explanations in their observation that “where a steep increase in EAs coincided with wider 
reform, package deals, issue linkage and norm-based framing could translate contestation into 
more stringent institutional change” (Héritier and Reh, 2012, p.1153). With this paper, we come 
closer to an appreciation of the respective role of social context and rationality.  
 
The trigger for change was no “September 11” (as an EP administrator told us in reference to 
LIBE’s changing politics in the wake of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center). It was 
rather an evolutionary process resulting from a growing awareness of the expanding scope of 
trilogues as well as growing unease as to potential implications of the phenomenon for the 
broader EP community—triggering a normative assessment. Large parties initiated change; 
and, at the height of EP internal reform, some options of institutional design were ruled out in 
the name of efficiency. Likewise, norms are fluid in the EP. If a change of personnel as well as 
party (to the Greens) leadership gives rise to a reasonable expectation that TRAN might move 
in the direction of practices elsewhere, established ECON norms may	lose their bite as a new 
and more pragmatic chair takes command. In line with sociological-constructivist perspectives, 
however, we note that change emerged from inside the EP, with the reform process set in train 
in 2007 before the first signs of external criticism (see, for instance, Bunyan 2007) emerged. 
The Council, as an institution interested in keeping EP negotiators in a secluded world of 
bargains, cannot be considered as a source of EP norms of oversight and pluralization.  
 
There was a core incompatibility of the ancien regime of trilogues with the EP’s central mission of 
institutional assertion together with the practical need to continue with an inexorable growth of 
early legislative agreements whose outcomes often suited the EP. Instead of being drawn into 
Council territory of quiet diplomacy (Shackleton, 2000), the EP had succeeded in drawing the 
Council into the political arena, where the EP could ‘go public’ as a means of influencing the 
course of trilogue negotiations—and asserting its identity as a normal legislator (Roederer-
Rynning and Greenwood, 2015). If these key MEPs can be understood as norm entrepreneurs 
in a rationalist context, a sociological-constructivist perspective helps us better understand the 
process, as it mobilized collectively held identities (as normal legislator) and was founded on a 
platform of expertise and deliberation where ECON, AFCO, the CoP and the CCC played 
important roles.  
 
Interviews 
 
Chairs: 
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Chair of the ECON committee of EP7, UK, 7.7.2014. 
 
Chair of the IMCO committee of EP7, UK, 27.8.2014. 
 
Chair of the EMPL committee of EP7, Brussels, 9.9.2014. 
 
Chair of the LIBE committee of EP7, Brussels, 9.9.2014. 
 
Chair of the ITRE committee of EP7, Brussels, 10.9.2014. 
 
Secretariats:  
 
Official of the European Parliament, Directorate General Internal Policies (DGIPol), Brussels, 
4.2.2015. 
 
Member of the committee secretariat of the Transport and Tourism Committee, Brussels, 
20.5.2014. 
 
Head of unit for codecision in EP7, Brussels, 22.5.2014 and 12.9.2014. 
 
Head of unit for codecision, and assistant in unit, in EP8, Brussels, 3.2.2015. 
 
Member of the secretariat of the unit for legislative coordination, Brussels, 4.2.2015. 
 
Member of the secretariat of the Committee on International Trade (INTA), Brussels, 2.2.2015. 
 
Member of the secretariat of the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) Brussels, 2.2.2015. 
 
Members of the secretariat of the Committee on Development (DEVE) Brussels, 2.2.2015. 
 
Members of the secretariat of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO), Brussels, 
3.2.2015. 
 
Members of the secretariat of the Committee on Regional Development (REGI), Brussels, 
3.2.2015. 
 
Members of the secretariat of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality 
(FEMM), Brussels, 4.2.2015. 
 
Member of the secretariat of the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT), Brussels, 
4.2.2015. 
 
Members of the secretariat of the Committee on Culture & Education (CULT), Brussels, 
6.2.2015. 
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Member of the secretariat of the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI), Brussels, 20.5.2014. 
 
Members of the secretariat of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food 
Safety (ENVI), Brussels, 20.5.2014. 
 
Member of the secretariat of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), 
Brussels, 20.5.2014. 
 
Member of the secretariat of the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN), Brussels, 
20.5.2014. 
 
Member of the secretariat of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
(LIBE), Brussels, 21.5.2014. 
 
Members of the secretariat of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), 
Brussels, 21.5.2014. 
 
Members of the secretariat of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), 
Brussels, 10.9.2014. 
 
Member of the secretariat of the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Affairs 
(IMCO), Brussels, 10.9.2014. 
 
Member of the secretariat of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI), 
Brussels, 20.5.14 & 9.9.2014. 
 
Other:  
Richard Corbett MEP, Brussels, 9.9.2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Binmore, K (1990) Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory (Oxford: Blackwell). 
 
Bunyan, T (2007) Secret Trilogues and the Democratic Deficit, Statewatch analyses 64, 
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-64-secret-trilogues.pdf, accessed on 15 February 2015. 
 
Burns C, Carter N, Davies G and Worsfold N. (2013) Still saving the earth? The European 
Parliament’s environmental record, Environmental Politics, 22: 6, 935-954. 
 
Crum, B & Fossum, J (2009). The Multilevel Parliamentary Field: a framework for theorizing 
representative democracy in the EU. European Political Science Review, 1, pp 249-271.  
	15	
	
 
EU Observer (2014) ‘Secret EU lawmaking: the triumph of the trilogue’, 
http://euobserver.com/investigations/123555 accessed on15 February 2015. 
 
European Parliament (2010) Conference of Presidents Working Party on Parliamentary Reform 
2007-2009 Final Report, http://www.parlorama.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2010/11/http___www.sib_.ep_.parl_.union_.eu_SIB_download.do_file_Doc
uments_99_FreeDocuments_02_Cpg_Rapport-Final-2007-2009_78063-broch-compl_en.pdf 
 
European Parliament (2011a) Minutes of the Conference of Committee Chairs, 25 October 
2011, PE 453.457.  
 
European Parliament (2011a) Minutes of the Conference of Committee Chairs, 13 December 
2011, PE 470.853.  
 
European Parliament (2011) Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Working Document on 
Revision of Rule 70 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure on Interinstitutional Negotiations in 
Legislative Procedures, PE 472.201v01.00, 14 September 2011. 
 
European Parliament (2012) Report on amendment of Rule 70 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure on 
interinstitutional negotiations in legislative procedures (2011/22988REG)), Rapporteur: Enrique 
Guerrero Salom, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, A7-0281/2012. 20 September 2012.  
 
European Parliament (2013) 20 years of Codecision: Conference report, Luxembourg: 
Conciliations and Codecision Secretariat’, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/code/events/20131105/report.pdf accessed on 15 February 
2015. 
 
European Parliament (2014a) Codecision and Conciliation: A guide to how the European 
Parliament co-legislates under the ordinary legislative procedure, December. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/code/information/guide_en.pdf accessed on 27 February 
2015. 
 
European Parliament (2014b) ‘Committee Statistical Report: 7th Legislature, DGIpol – Unit for 
Legislative Coordination’, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/code/about/starreport_en.pdf  
accessed on 16 February 2015. 
 
European Parliament (2014c) ‘Activity Report on Codecision and Conciliation: 7th 
Parliamentary Term’, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/code/information/activity_reports/activity_report_2009_201
4_en.pdf  accessed on 27 February 2015. 
 
Farrell, H. and Héritier, A. (2004) ‘Interorganizational negotiation and intraorganizational 
power in shared decision-making: early agreements under codecision and their impact on the 
European Parliament and Council’, Comparative Political Studies 37(10): 1184-1212. 
	16	
	
 
Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K (1998) ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, 
International Organization, 52: 887-917.  
 
Florini, A (1996) The Evolution of International Norms, International Studies Quarterly 40, 3, 363-
389. 
 
Greenwood, J and Roederer-Rynning, C (2014) ‘The Europeanization of the Basel process: 
Financial Harmonization between Globalization and Parliamentarization’, Regulation and 
Governance, DOI: 10.1111/rego.12063 accessed on 27 February 2015. 
 
Héritier, A. and Reh, C. (2012) ‘Codecision and its Discontents: Intra-organisational Politics 
and Institutional Reform in the European Parliament’, West European Politics 35(5):1134-1157. 
 
Huber, K. and Shackleton, M. (2013) ‘Codecision: a practitioner’s view from inside the 
Parliament’, Journal of European Public Policy 20(7): 1040-1055.  
 
International New York Times (2014) ‘E.U. chided for lack of openness’ 24 April 2014, 
http://news-business.vlex.com/vid/chided-corruption-growing-distrust-507432674 accessed 
on 16 June 2014. 
 
Jacqué, J-P. (2009) ‘Une vision réaliste de la procedure de codécision’ in Collectif, Mélanges en 
hommage à Georges Vandersanden, Brussels: Buylant, pp.183-202.  
 
Jupille J, Caparaso J and Checkel J (2003) ‘Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism 
and the Study of the European Union’, Comparative Political Studies, 36: 1-2, 7-40. 
 
Katzenstein, P (1996) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press). 
 
Krasner, S (1983) ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences’ in Stephen Krasner (ed.) 
International Regimes (Cornell University Press), 1-22 
 
Krasner, S (1988) ‘Sovereignty. An Institutional Perspective’, Comparative Political Studies, 21: 66-
94. 
 
 
Lewis, J (2003) Informal integration and the supranational construction of the Council, Journal 
of European Public Policy, 10(6): 996–1019. 
 
March, J. and Olsen, J.P. (1989) Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, New 
York: Free Press. 
 
Obholzer, Lukas and Christine Reh (2012) ‘How to Negotiate under Co-decision in the EU: 
Reforming Trilogues and First-Reading Agreements’ CEPS Policy Brief 270,   
	17	
	
http://aei.pitt.edu/34912/1/PB_270_Obholzer_%26_Reh_Reforming_Triologues.pdf 
accessed 26 February 2015.  
 
Reh C, Héritier A, Bressanelli E, and Koop, C. (2013) ‘The Informal Politics of Legislation: 
Explaining Secluded Decision Making in the European Union’, Comparative Political Studies 46(9): 
1112–1142. 
 
Ripoll Servent, A. (2011) ‘Co-decision in the European Parliament: Comparing Rationalist and 
Constructivists Explanations of the “Returns Directive’, Journal of Contemporary European Research 
7(1): 3-22.  
 
Rittberger, B. (2005) Building Europe’s Parliament. Democratic Representaiton Beyond the Nationa State, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Roederer-Rynning, C & Greenwood, J (2015): The culture of trilogues, Journal of European Public 
Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2014.992934 
 
Rose, R (2013) Representing Europeans: a pragmatic approach: Oxford University Press. 
 
Ruggie, J (1993) ‘Multilateralism: The anatomy of an institution’, in J Ruggie (ed.) Multilateralism 
matters: The theory and praxis of an institutional form, New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Schelling, T (1960) The Strategy of Conflict (Boston: Harvard University Press). 
 
Shackleton, M (2000) ‘The Politics of Codecision’, Journal of Common Market Studies 38(2): 325-
342. 
 
Slaughter A-M (2004) A NewWorld Order. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
 
Ullmann-Margalit, E (1977) The Emergence of Norms (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
 
  
	18	
	
Table 1 – Legislative activity of EP committees, EP7  
 
LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY TRILOGUE ACTIVITY 
EP 
committee 
Number 
of 
adopted 
co-
decision 
files in 
EP7 
% of all 
adopted 
co-
decision 
in EP7 
% of first-
reading 
agreement 
EP committee Number 
of 
trilogues 
in EP7 
% of all 
trilogues 
in EP7 
ENVI 70 14 84 ECON 331 21.5
ECON 54 11 98 ENVI 165 10.7
LIBE 50 10 86 LIBE 163 10.6
INTA 48 10 79 AGRI 103 6.7
ITRE 41 8 85 REGI 96 6.2
JURI 37 8 97 EMPL 94 6.2
IMCO 35 7 89 ITRE 91 5.9
TRAN 35 7 63 TRAN 89 5.8
AGRI 27 6 89 INTA 75 4.9
EMPL 22 5 82 IMCO 71 4.6
PECH 20 4 80 JURI 66 4.3
REGI 14 3 100 AFET 49 3.2
AFET 9 2 89 BUDG 42 2.7
BUDG 7 1 86 PECH 36 2.3
CULT 6 1 67 DEVE 28 1.8
DEVE 5 1 60 CULT 16 1.0
CONT 2 0 50 CONT 15 1.0
FEMM 2 0 0 AFCO 9 0.6
AFCO 1 0 100 FEMM 2 0.1
Total  485  1541  
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Table 2 – Two views on norms and implications for the institutionaliatization of EP 
legislative power   
 
Lifecycle of 
norms 
Norms as coordinating devices
(rationalism) 
Norms as legitimate standards of 
behavior  
(sociological-constructivism) 
Emergence - Norms do not come from 
social interaction; if some 
norms are active, they will 
come from domestic politics 
or inter-institutional 
interaction (e.g. influence of 
the Council); 
- Attempts to regulate practices 
or develop new devices 
would reflect a crisis in, or 
sub-optimal cooperation 
between Council and EP; 
there is no collective 
perception that something is 
not the way it “ought to be”;  
- Norms are promoted by 
utility-maximizing 
entrepreneurs motivated by 
the prospect of rewards, 
material (stream of resources) 
as well as non-material 
(reputation) rewards;  
- Evidence of cost-benefit 
reasoning and practices or 
well-defined reciprocity 
expectations. 
- Promoted by MEPs “having 
strong notions about appropriate 
and desirable behavior in their 
community” (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998, 896); concretely, a 
growing awareness of the 
expanding scope of trilogues and 
that a collective thinking must 
take place in order to examine 
the appropriate way to deal with 
this phenomenon; growing 
unease as to potential 
implications of the phenomenon 
for broader community as well 
as possible incidents triggering a 
normative assessment; 
- These norm entrepreneurs are 
supported by organizational 
platforms providing them with 
expertise and other 
organizational resources needed 
to construct their normative 
argument;  
- Persuasion logic evidenced by 
“collective plotting, in which the 
group legitimates and 
delegitimates arguments in the 
interest of finding joint 
solutions” (Lewis 2003, 107); 
persuasion may rely on a mix of 
appeal to sentiments and 
emotions as well as more logical 
attempts to link specific norm to 
a broader structure of principles 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998);   
- “Tipping point” is reached when 
“norm entrepreneurs have 
persuaded a critical mass of [EP 
actors] to become norm leaders 
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and adopt the new norms”,
evidenced by either quantitative 
rules of thumb (1/3 of relevant 
community actors) or adoption 
by “critical” actors (Finnemore 
and Sikkink 1998, 901); 
Diffusion - Generally weak due to thin 
socialization patterns; 
- Varies across committees 
depending on the expected 
utility function of legislators; 
very little influence of cross-
committee fora discussing 
norms of EP engagement in 
trilogues (political as well as 
administrative); possible 
influence, however, of 
Conference of Presidents in 
ad hoc decisions on the basis 
of redistributive calculation or 
in the shadow of power 
asymmetry; 
- “Decoupling effects” 
(Checkel 2002): “agents learn 
to ‘talk the talk’, and avert the 
potential ‘socializing force of 
group pressure or arguments” 
(Lewis 2003, 105); 
- Through competition in 
environment characterized by 
scarce resources and goal of 
attraction and retainment of 
resources (Kleibrink 2011) 
and coercion in cases of 
highly asymmetric power 
relations (Kleibrink 2011);  
 
- Broad norm acceptance 
evidenced by converging 
behavior (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998); 
- Varies across committees 
depending on the EP committee 
chair “decision-making style” 
and socialization in cross-
committee fora (administrative 
as well as political) where norms 
of EP engagement are discussed 
and systematized; especially, 
influence of Conference of 
Committee Chairs (CCC) and 
various EP horizontal units 
(CODE; CORDLEG) aiming at 
developing standards of EP 
practices in trilogues; 
- Emulation of perceived 
“models”; norm-breaching 
generates “collective plotting” in 
order to reassess legitimacy 
arguments; norm-conforming 
generates praise;  
- Evidence of expanded “self” 
incorporating perceptions of 
collective obligation and 
responsibility and leading to 
moderating demands in cases of 
collective resistance to individual 
claims (Lewis 2003); 
Internalizat
ion 
- Rare since loyalty to groups is 
not intrinsically generated 
(Lewis 2003);  
- Norms are seldom “self-
binding” (Wendt 1999, cited 
in Lewis 2003, 103) but must 
be enforced;  
- Possible given endogenous 
construction of norms;  
- Self-binding norms difficult to 
see given their taken-for-granted 
character; but norm-breaching 
generates stigmatization and 
disapproval (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998). 
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- Competition for resources, 
threats, and asymmetric 
power are primary 
mechanisms of 
internalization. 
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Table 3 - Regulating trilogues: The path of EP internal reform 
 
Date Actor Issue / Output
2001 Group of Vice-Presidents 
responsible for oversight of 
co-decision 
Issue of trilogue regulation first formally raised by 
the group of Vice-Presidents responsible for 
oversight of co-decision. 
2004  Best practice Guidelines for First and Second Reading 
Agreements under the Codecision Procedure. 
15 
February 
2007 
Conference of Presidents Conference of Presidents sets up a “Working 
party on parliamentary reform”; the party if 
chaired by MEP Dagmar Roth-Berendt and 
composed of one member from each political 
group. 
2009  Code of Conduct for Negotiating in the Context of 
Codecision Procedures concluded at the end of the 
sixth term, and established as an Annex XX to 
the Rules of Procedure. 
19 
October 
2010 
Conference of Committee 
Chairs 
CCC holds extensive exchange of views with 
contributions by the Secretaries General of the 
political groups. 
10 March 
2011 
Conference of Presidents CoP takes up the issue.
18 April 
2011 
EP President Buzek In a letter, EP President Buzek invites AFCO to 
review EP Rules for adopting first-reading 
legislation under codecision with a view to 
making Code of Conduct more binding. 
14 June 
2011 
AFCO S&D Enrique Guerrero Salom is appointed 
rapporteur for the report on EP Rules of 
Procedure, Rule 70: Interinstitutional negotiations 
in legislative procedures. 
1 
December 
2011 
EP plenary Committee referral announced in Parliament, 
first-reading. 
13 
February 
2012 
ECON ALDE Sharon Bowles from ECON is appointed 
rapporteur for opinion.  
14 
September 
2011 
AFCO Working Document on Revision of Rule 70 of 
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure on Interinstitutional 
Negotiations in Legislative Procedures. 
25 
October 
2011 
Conference of Committee 
Chairs 
Rapporteur Guerrero-Salom discusses revision of 
RoP. 
 
27 
October 
2011 
AFCO First Draft Report on Amendment of Rule 70 of 
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure on Interinstitutional 
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Negotiations in Legislative Procedures, PE473.959v01-
00, 27 October 2011. 
13 
December 
2011 
Conference of Committee 
Chairs 
Detailed discussion of Guerrero-Salom draft 
report.  
8 March 
2012 
AFCO Second Draft Report on Amendment of Rule 70 of 
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure on Interinstitutional 
Negotiations in Legislative Procedures, PE473.959v03-
00, 8 March 2012. 
2 July 
2012 
ECON ECON opinion adopted unanimously on 2 July 
2012 (33 votes in favor; 0 against; 0 abstentions). 
17 
September 
2012 
AFCO Report on Amendment of Rule 70 of Parliament’s Rules 
of Procedure on Interinstitutional Negotiations in 
Legislative Procedures adopted in AFCO with 20 
votes in favor and 1 abstention. 
25 
September 
2012 
EP Plenary AFCO Report on Amendment of Rule 70 of 
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure on Interinstitutional 
Negotiations in Legislative Procedures tabled in 
plenary. 
20 
November 
2012 
EP Plenary Report adopted in plenary: 11 amendments are 
adopted (8 tabled by AFCO; 3 tabled by political 
groups) leading to revision of Rule 70 and 
introduction of Rule 70a. 
 
